Japan’s example. Does it apply to our current challenge?
Monday, 07/26/2010 - 4:17 pm by Robert Johnson | 3 Comments
Author Mark Weisbrot examines Kenneth Rogoff’s arguments in favor of deficit cutting, but doesn’t find anything convincing. Read the full article:
No Convincing Economic Arguments Against Further Stimulus Spending
By Mark Weisbrot
This article originally appeared on The Guardian.
In much of the world, including the United States and Europe, a debate is taking place about whether the government’s first responsibility should be to reduce unemployment — which is at elevated levels — or to reduce government deficits and debt. Many of the arguments for deficit reduction are simplistic, based on ignorance, or ideologically-based. For example, there are inappropriate comparisons of government to household debt, a fixation on absolute numbers without any comparison to national income, or just right-wing opposition to government in general. Although these are the most commonly propagated views on television and through the media, it is worth taking a moment to examine the (ostensibly) more sophisticated and economics-based arguments and see whether they hold water.
Kenneth Rogoff is Professor of Economics at Harvard University and a former Chief Economist at the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This week he responded to some of the pro-stimulus arguments:
“Some portray Japan, with nearly a 200 per cent government debt to income ratio, as a poster child for extremely indebted countries with low interest rates. Japan’s ’success’, of course, has a lot to do with its government’s ability to sell debt domestically. How the country will handle its finances as saving by retirees shrinks and as its labour force rapidly shrinks, remains to be seen.”
Some background: Japan has a gross debt-to-GDP ratio of about 227 percent of GDP. This is more than three times the level of the United States. But more than 100 percentage points (of GDP) of this debt is owed to the Japanese central bank. This means that the interest payments on this debt go to the government of Japan, so there is no interest burden added by this part of the debt. In fact, Japan’s net interest payments are less than 2 percent of GDP, which is a modest amount.
It also means something else that most of the economists in this debate are not eager to talk about: it means that Japan has financed nearly half of its public debt by creating money. In other words, instead of the government borrowing money from investors, the central bank created money and lent it to the government. In the popular imagination, this creation of trillions of dollars (in yen) to finance government deficits has to cause serious inflation. However, the Japanese experience has been the opposite: over the last 20 years, Japan’s consumer price index has risen about 5 percent — that’s the 20-year total, not annual inflation.
Rogoff is correct to say that the domestic ownership of Japan’s debt is key to its success. But this is just an additional argument for the United States, or Europe, to finance deficit spending through money creation at this time. Such financing is by definition domestic ownership — i.e. ownership by the central bank. In the Eurozone, the European Central Bank (ECB) would have to agree to refund the interest payments on the debt to the borrowing countries, so as to duplicate what Japan (and the United States) has done with its own central bank.
Of course, Japan’s debt that is held by the public is also held mostly by domestic investors. So this part of Rogoff’s argument is really making the case for avoiding the chronic trade deficits that the United States has run for decades. It is the overvalued dollar, and the resulting trade deficits, that drive foreign borrowing in the United States.
As for the warnings about what might happen when savings and the labor force shrink, we have heard this rhetoric for decades from deficit hawks in the United States and Europe. Suffice it to say that there are many options open to rich countries should they ever face the problem of a “labor shortage.” But unfortunately our problem for the foreseeable future is the opposite. It is a shortage of jobs, not labor.
Rogoff cites his own work, with Carmen Reinhart, in arguing that debt-to-GDP ratios of more than 100 percent are “above the threshold where growth might be affected.” But their paper really doesn’t show much at all, especially for economies like the United States and the Eurozone that can borrow in their own currencies. Countries that end up with debt greater than 100 percent of GDP are likely to have other problems that got them there. As others have also noted, without controlling for these other factors — which this paper decidedly does not do — there is no way of establishing causality. In fact, the authors do not even control for changes in population growth, since they look only at GDP growth rather than per capita GDP.
Rogoff adds another self-defeating argument: “Importantly, governments that emphasize long-term fiscal sustainability are likely to have an easier time inducing their central banks to maintain highly supportive monetary conditions.”
In other words, he is saying that central banks might react to expansionary fiscal policy in the present situation by tightening monetary policy. But this just means that the central bank should be subordinated to national economic policy, instead of the other way around. He is taking for granted that central banks must be “independent.” But as experience has demonstrated — e.g. the U.S. Federal Reserve somehow missed the two biggest asset bubbles in world history — this doesn’t necessarily mean independent of Wall Street, it means independent of the public interest. So yes, a government that wants to use expansionary fiscal policy will need the cooperation of its central bank. And should have it.
Rogoff argues that “anemic growth with sustained high unemployment is par for the course in post-financial-crisis recoveries.” Par for whose course? If past governments made stupid mistakes and/or didn’t care about condemning a generation of low-income young people to years of unemployment, does that mean we should do the same? At the end of the day, Rogoff provides no convincing economic argument why either the United States or Europe cannot, or should not, finance the necessary stimulus until unemployment approaches more normal levels.
Rob Johnson is a Senior Fellow and the Director of the Project on Global Finance at the Roosevelt Institute.
































































I would argue that the Japanese experience demonstrates the futility of stop/start fiscal policy and a corresponding reluctance to deal with the nub of the toxic assets within the banking system. In short, it provides a salutary warning against precisely the type of policies championed by the Geithner Treasury. As far as Rogoff/Reinhart goes, 800 years of allegedly empirical data sounds very impressive, but the reality is that institutions, approaches to monetary and fiscal policy, and exchange rate regimes have changed dramatically over that period. And as Randy Wray and Yeva Nersisyan illustrate in a new critique featured at the Levy Institute (www.levy.org), “the finding that “emerging” nations are constrained by debt ratios of 60% rather than 90% appears to be linked by the authors to emerging nations’ propensity to issue foreign-currency denominated debt, and to foreign ownership of the debt (with domestic holding facing greater risk of default). They also find that when governments float their currency and limit government debt to domestic currency denomination, constraints are much looser. Indeed, that appears to be a large part of the process through which countries “graduate” from serial default to non-defaulters. We concur; we just wish they had made much more of this distinction.
The problem is that the ratios provided by Reinhart and Rogoff do not usually make such distinctions; indeed, even on a careful reading of their book it is impossible to determine which government defaults occurred under fixed exchange rates (either a gold standard or a peg to a foreign currency) versus a floating rate (no promise to convert at a fixed rate). So far as we can tell, there are no government defaults on debt (domestic or foreign) in the case of a floating rate currency contained in their data set. We are not sure because it is not possible to tell from their analysis. They do distinguish between “domestic debt” (presumably denominated in domestic currency) and “external debt” (in the case of emerging countries this is said to be “often” denominated in foreign currency, but no data is provided to make a distinction) (p. 10, 13). In one of the appendices to the book, they list their data sources for public debt but under commentary they note “dollars” for some countries. Does this mean that the countries listed have adopted the US dollar as their “domestic” currency? We are not sure, but if so, why would this be considered to be domestic debt?”
Posted by Marshall Auerback | July 26th, 2010 at 9:13 pm
Interesting and insightful. Thank you.
Posted by James Call | July 27th, 2010 at 11:12 am
I note that nowhere in this discussion has something about the deficit in the US balance of payments been brought to the front except to indicate, correctly, it is the trade defecit that results in foreign holdings of US debt.
After all how could we buy more from foreigners than we sell to foreigners, unless foreigners lend us the funds to buy these extra goods?. But they love to lend us the money — because they usually believe export-led growth is good economic growth.. Unfortnately all the nations of the world cannot have export led growth. and the fact that since 1981 the US has run persistent trade deficits has made the US the engine of growth for most of the rest of the world — especially in the 1980 Japan and Germany and Latin american, and starting in the 1990s the Asiatic tigers such as China, eyc.
But of course when we get out of thisGreat Recession (or should I say “if”) can we again afford to run such large trade deficits? Geithner says no — and wants the Chinese to raise the value of the Chinese yuan. I see “experts” saying if the yuan increases by 40 per cent, then the US deficit with China will disappear! But so will the Chinese export industries!! And I do not think China nor anone else really wants that!
If we could cure the trade imblanaces without the deficit nation depreciating its currency, then the question of private sector deficit-surplus balance vs. the proper size of the public sector deficit - surplus balance could be more easily analyzed and handled.
Can the seeming persistent US international paymnts deficit be cured with large changes in exchange rates? Yes.
How? By adopting a 21 century variant of the “Keynes Plan” that was proposed by Keynes in Bretton Woods. I have devised such a 21 century plan — which does not require a Supranational central bank (as the original Keynes plan did) and my proposal permits each nation to pursue independent monetary, fiscal, and anti-inflation (or anti- deflation) policy . I have been advocating such a plan since 1990 — because the global open economy of the last few decades changes the basis of discussion on macroeconomic policy. [See chapters 7 and 8 of my 2009 book entitled THE KEYNES SOLUTION.]
Henry Lui (a member of the Roosevelt Institute brain trust) and I wrote an open letter to the World Leaders attending the 2008 G-20 meetings — We saw devestation and internratiional contagion spreading globallyfrom the US financial crisis that had started about a year earlier. In that letter Henry and I suggested ” a new financial architecture based on an updated 21 century version of the Keynes Plan otiginally proposed at Breton Woods in 1944″.
How long will it take before people — be they deficit hawks, doves, OMB directors,Secretaries of the Treasury,etc, to think big enough to see tha deficits or surplus questions require not only fiscal policy actions but actions on the international front– since we are engaged in a global economy?
Paul Davidson
Posted by paul davidson | July 27th, 2010 at 3:43 pm